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 29 
Abstract 30 
This study investigated whether young children’s conformity to a consensus varies across the 31 
normative domain and age. One-hundred-and-sixty-eight 3- and 5-year-olds participated. 32 
Each child was presented with a puzzle box that had two transparent compartments. In a 33 
reward preference condition, one of the compartments contained one sticker, while the other 34 
contained 12 stickers. In a perceptual judgement and an arbitrary preference condition, one 35 
compartment contained a short plank, while one contained a perceptually longer plank. Each 36 
child was shown a video of four female adults who were each asked the same question within 37 
condition: “Which one’s the biggest?” (perceptual task; each model retrieved the smaller 38 
block)’, “Which one do you want?” (reward preference; each model retrieved the smaller 39 
reward), and  “Which one do you want?” (arbitrary preference; each model retrieved the 40 
smaller plank). Children were then asked the same question by condition, and allowed to 41 
retrieve the item. Notably, more children conformed in the arbitrary preference condition than 42 
in the reward preference and perceptual judgement conditions, with three-year-olds 43 
conforming significantly more than five-year-olds. Five-year-olds were more successful, and 44 
imitated with greater fidelity, including demonstrating overimitation. However, less 45 
overimitation was observed in the arbitrary preference condition. Together, these findings 46 
show that children are sensitive to the contextual cues of the domain in which they are 47 
witnessing norms, and vary their own conformity based on such cues. Further, children can 48 
navigate which information to copy to fulfil their own ends.  49 
  50 
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 53 
Conformity to norms has a powerful influence on individual judgements, attitudes and 54 
behaviour, as demonstrated by the classic work of Sherif (1935, 1936, 1937) and Asch (1951, 55 
1955, 1956). Due to the critical role of conformity in our choices and behaviour, it is essential 56 
that we understand how judgements arise in the face of conflicts in normative information: 57 
notably, the conflict between individuals’ personal information and the majority’s behaviour 58 
(Asch, 1951), as well as between different types of information presented by norms, 59 
‘injunctive’ information about what one should do and ‘descriptive’ information about what 60 
the majority does (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). ‘Social norms’ and ‘conformity’ are terms with 61 
many uses, and as a result there is no consensus about meaning (Bichieri & Muldoon, 2011; 62 
Chun & Rimal, 2016). For the purpose of the present study, we use ‘norm’ to be the 63 
behaviour adopted by the majority of a group, and ‘conformity’ to mean behaving in line with 64 
the majority behaviour. A ‘consensus’ is an unanimous group behaviour.  For instance, if 65 
most individuals do not litter, this is the norm; if all individuals do not litter, that is a 66 
consensus; and if I do not litter because of the influence of the group I am conforming. 67 
Recently, the influence of norms has been examined in the context of children’s learning, 68 
addressing questions relating to how children use norms to guide their own learning and 69 
behaviour (e.g., Corriveau, Fusaro & Harris, 2009; Morgan, Laland & Harris, 2015; Turner, 70 
Nielsen, & Collier-Baker, 2014). The aim of the present study is to examine how levels of 71 
children’s behavioural conformity to the descriptive norm vary by task domain; we discuss 72 
our results in terms of the possible processes which may cause the effects found.   73 
Young children conform to social cues provided by majorities: three- and four-year-74 
olds prefer the label given to an ambiguous object by a consensus of three individuals rather 75 
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than the label of a single individual (Corriveau, et al. 2009); showing adoption of descriptive 76 
norms. Further, four-year-olds adopt the behaviour of an informant whose response is 77 
supported by a group, through the smiles and head nods of two bystanders, over an informant 78 
who receives head shakes and frowns from the two bystanders (Fusaro & Harris, 2008), thus 79 
showing support for children’s use of injunctive norms. Turner et al. (2014) compared three-80 
year-olds’ use of these different forms of normative behaviour, finding that children are 81 
influenced by descriptive over injunctive norms when the two are misaligned.   82 
Conflicts also occur in relation to copying the majority versus the minority. 83 
Conforming to conventions is critical to societal functioning, as it allows new members of a 84 
group to pick up the social norms quickly without having to understand the rationale behind 85 
them. However, it is also essential that individuals do not blindly conform, adopting the 86 
behaviour of the majority when in fact this may be disadvantageous to the individual as well 87 
as to the group as a whole (Del Vicario et al. 2016), which can result in detrimental 88 
‘information cascades’ (see Rieucau & Giraldeau 2009). Further, as well as not conforming 89 
to avoiding the adoption of inferior behaviours, individuals need to break from the status quo 90 
for new, advantageous innovations to appear within the technological and social practices 91 
(Dean et al. 2014). Thus it is critical that we understand how normativity affects learning in 92 
children and how biases for majority copying versus personal interests and information are 93 
navigated.  94 
Explaining fidelity (copying) versus selectivity (using alternative options) in many 95 
realms of child learning remains a challenge. Over and Carpenter (2012) addressed this topic, 96 
pointing-out that while children can appear credulous, on other occasions they can be 97 
discriminating and rational in their learning, whether from several models or one. For 98 
instance, research into the imitation of causally irrelevant actions, known as ‘overimitation’, 99 
has shown that children (and adults) copy irrelevant actions under many conditions, including 100 
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when they believe that the experiment is over (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007), when there is a 101 
reward at stake (Flynn & Smith, 2012; Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011), and 102 
when the actions are presented by an individual they believe to be a fellow participant (Flynn 103 
& Smith, 2012). On other occasions children rationally mediate their imitation (Gergely, 104 
Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002; Meltzoff, 1995). Over and Carpenter argue that three factors 105 
moderate fidelity versus selectivity: (i) desire to affiliate with the social group or model, (ii) 106 
social pressure felt in the situation, and (iii) the child’s own goals. Others highlight that 107 
children construe the situation as being a ‘ritual’, in which behaviour is adopted by a 108 
conventional rather than instrumental function, suggesting that this may explain the 109 
discrepancies (Kapitany & Nielsen, 2015; Legare, Wen, Herrmann, & Whitehouse, 2015). 110 
Alternatively, Walker and Andrade (1996) provide evidence that situational ambiguity is an 111 
important factor, for children aged three to seventeen years, with greater uncertainty causing 112 
more conformity.  113 
While there is still much research needed to address these differing explanations, 114 
several recent studies have cast light on the fact that the domain within which the normative 115 
behaviour is presented, as well the observing children’s age, have an influence on conformity. 116 
Seston Schillaci and Kelemen (2014) found that 3- and 4-year-olds deferred to a majority’s 117 
behaviour with regard to object-functions. Children were more likely to agree with the 118 
majority when majority and minority opinions were equally plausible, especially when the 119 
majority demonstrated an overt consensus. However, four-year-olds actively eschewed the 120 
majority opinion when it was implausible in the context of the artefact’s functional design; in 121 
such cases four-year-olds trusted their own judgement over that of the majority. Similarly, 122 
Corriveau and Harris (2010) showed 3- and 4-year-olds deferred to a majority less often 123 
when their judgement would be functionally tested than when it was a perceptual judgement. 124 
That is, when they were making a judgement about the length of comparative lines they 125 
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deferred more than when those comparative lines would be used to build a bridge for a soft-126 
toy protagonist to cross, than when they simply had to state which was longer. Recently, 127 
Bernard, Harris, Terrier and Clément (2015) gave a further demonstration of preschoolers’ 128 
weighing-up of personal versus norm-based information. They found that 3- to 5-year-olds 129 
were more likely to rely on social information if personal information was ambiguous, and if 130 
there was a consensus of three individuals providing information, rather than one. Further, it 131 
was found that 5-year-olds were more likely to rely on personal than social information. 132 
Normative and moral social factors have also been shown to be important in young children’s 133 
conformity and imitation (Kim, Chen, Smetana, & Greenberger, 2016; Rakoczy, Warneken, 134 
& Tomasello, 2009).   135 
In the current study we directly tested 3- and 5-year-old children’s conformity to a 136 
majority’s judgement across three normative domains: (i) reward preference, in which the 137 
majority selected one sticker over twelve stickers, (ii) perceptual judgement, in which the 138 
majority was presented with two wooden blocks and selected an obviously smaller block 139 
when asked which is biggest, and (iii) arbitrary preference, in which the majority selected one 140 
of two blocks when asked which one they preferred (which clearly had no obviously ‘correct’ 141 
answer). We define ‘normative domains’ as contexts that draw on different cognitive and 142 
social processes. This study presents two critical extensions to the current understanding of 143 
conformity. First, it addresses whether young children show differing levels of conformity 144 
across different norm domains using a standardised procedure across each of these domains. 145 
In line with previous research, we predict less conformity in norm domains in which there is 146 
a clear contrast with one’s own perception or desires (these are the reward preference and 147 
perceptual judgement domains), compared to domains in which the rationale for the 148 
majority’s judgement is not clear or may indeed be conventional (the arbitrary preference 149 
domain) and there is no clear contrast with one’s own judgement. Such domain differences 150 
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may also be influenced by the age of the participants, with younger children (3-year-olds) 151 
being more likely to conform across all the domains than older children (5-year-olds; 152 
mirroring developmental changes seen in other studies (Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Seston 153 
Schillaci & Kelemen, 2014; Walker & Andrade, 1996). The age groups chosen represent the 154 
beginning of early social development and, at five years, move into middle childhood. They, 155 
thereby, give us a clear picture of changes in norm use in early development, fitting with the 156 
majority of previous research in this area, which focus on 3- to 5-year-olds (Corriveau & 157 
Harris, 2010; Seston Schillaci & Kelemen, 2014; Walker & Andrade, 1996). 158 
Recently, there has been increased interest in how aspects of context, including the 159 
social context, affect copying behaviour and the implications this might have for learning and 160 
cultural acquisition, transmission and evolution more broadly (Reader, Morand-Ferron, & 161 
Flynn, 2016). The current study adds to this literature by exploring whether a majority’s 162 
behaviour, which was clearly inaccurate (as in the perceptual judgement task), less 163 
advantageous (as in the reward preference) or ambiguous (as in the arbitrary preference) 164 
influences a young child’s subsequent behaviour in terms of the level of fidelity s/he 165 
demonstrates to the behaviour that s/he witnessed the majority undertake on a task. It could 166 
be argued that when majorities appear to be less accurate or undertake less advantageous 167 
behaviour they are less likely to be copied across other behaviours than majorities whose 168 
behaviour is ambiguous. For example, when a majority’s behaviour was pitted against 169 
success, such that the majority’s actions were unsuccessful in opening a puzzle box while the 170 
minority’s behaviour was successful, 4- and 5-year-old children copied the behaviour of the 171 
minority (Wils, Collier-Baker & Nielsen, 2015). Thus, we predict that 3-year-olds should 172 
show greater fidelity, in terms of action replication including overimitation, when the 173 
majority’s selection of an object is ambiguous than when it contrasts with a child’s own 174 
preferences or perceptions than 5-year-olds. ‘Overimitation’ refers to children’s proclivity to 175 
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copy obviously causally redundant actions, and has been argued to be influenced by the same 176 
factors as imitation and conformity (see Lyon et al., 2007; Kenward, Karlsson, & Persson, 177 
2011; Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013; Nielsen & Blank 2010).  That is, while both 178 
judgment and imitation have been argued to be influenced by similar sets of social influence 179 
(Over & Carpenter, 2012), our study may give further information about how these 180 
phenomena are related. Addressing such questions establishes whether children are sensitive 181 
to the contextual cues of the domain in which they are witnessing the conformity of other’s 182 
behaviour, varying their own conformity and subsequent behaviour based on such cues.  183 
 184 
Method 185 
Participants 186 
 One hundred and sixty-eight children from schools and nurseries in North East 187 
England participated. Participants were drawn from two age groups: three-year-olds (n = 84, 188 
40 girls, M = 44.65 months, SD = 3.50 months) and five-year-olds (n = 84, 38 girls, M = 189 
67.68 months, SD = 3.35 months). The majority of children were White British, Asian being 190 
the second most represented ethnic group. Informed consent was provided by the children’s 191 
parents, and the nursery or school staff. Also all children verbally consented to participate 192 
when asked if they wished to take part. Ethical approval was given by the School of 193 
Education’s Ethics Committee at Durham University. 194 
 195 
Design 196 
 A 2 x 3 between groups design was used to assess whether age (3-year-olds versus 5-197 
year-olds) and norm domain (reward preference, perceptual judgement, and arbitrary 198 
preference) influenced conformity. The key outcome variable was whether a child’s choice of 199 
an object matched the choice of the group (conformed) or the child selected an alternative 200 
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option (did not conform). We also investigated, across these different groups (age and norm 201 
domain), whether children imitated the same sequence of actions as the group to remove the 202 
selected object from a puzzle box (imitation fidelity) or whether they did not replicate 203 
faithfully; this imitation fidelity included a measure of overimitation demonstrated by the 204 
majority. The children’s success on the task, acquisition of the object from a puzzle box, was 205 
also recorded.   206 
  207 
Apparatus 208 
The Duobox was the apparatus used in this study (see Figure 1). It has two conjoined 209 
compartments which are identical, apart from the colour painted on the back wall of the 210 
apparatus: one compartment was blue, and one was red. The apparatus was transparent, such 211 
that the object contained inside each compartment could be seen easily. The sequence of 212 
actions modelled was: (i) the removal of the bolt from the top of the apparatus (labelled a in 213 
Figure 1), a causally irrelevant action allowing the study of overimitation. Then three 214 
different defences were removed to allow a door to be opened and the object retrieved: (ii) a 215 
horizontal latch was twisted to a vertical position (labelled b in Figure 1), (iii) a hook was 216 
pulled clockwise (labelled c in Figure 1), and (iv) a flat bolt was pulled to the right (labelled d 217 
in Figure 1). In the reward preference condition one of the compartments contained one 218 
sticker, while the other contained 12 stickers, identical in shape and size although with 219 
varying designs, including three replicates of the alternative single sticker, 100% of both 220 
three- and five-year-olds preferred the 12 stickers to the one in pilot testing (N = 20). In the 221 
perceptual judgement and arbitrary preference conditions one compartment contained a short 222 
plank of wood, while the other contained a long plank. The long plank was three-times the 223 
length, and pilot testing found that 100% of both three- and five-year-olds correctly identified 224 
their differential length from their position in the apparatus (N = 20).  225 
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 226 
[Figure 1 about here] 227 
 228 
Conformity Stimulus 229 
 To establish the descriptive norm, children were showed a video of four female adult 230 
models opening the Duobox. Initially, the four models stood side-by-side, and then each 231 
model stepped forward in turn and opened the box using identical actions. Thus children saw 232 
each model: (i) step forward from the group, (ii) be asked a question regarding their 233 
perception or preference (differing based on condition), (iii) perform the same action 234 
sequence on the Duobox, (iv) retrieve the reward, and (v) return to the group. After each 235 
model retrieved the item from the Duobox, they held it towards the camera and smiled.  236 
In the reward preference condition, each model’s actions were preceded by the 237 
question “Which one do you want?”; with all models retrieving the small reward. In the 238 
perceptual judgement condition, each model’s action was preceded by the question “Which 239 
one’s the biggest”?, with all models retrieving the smaller plank, despite it being perceptually 240 
smaller. In the arbitrary preference condition, the model’s actions were preceded by “Which 241 
one do you want?” All retrieved the smaller plank, there was no obvious natural preference 242 
for either plank. The side, red or blue, was consistent within the video with the models and 243 
within each child’s attempt, but was counterbalanced across participants within conditions.   244 
 245 
Procedure  246 
 Testing took place in a quiet room away from other children within a child’s school or 247 
nursery. After a short settling period, children were shown the apparatus and asked a series of 248 
questions to clarify that they understood that, (i) it had two sides, (ii) the sides were different 249 
colours, and (iii) the contents of each side were different. Children then watched one of the 250 
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conformity stimuli videos. They were told that their job was to get something from inside the 251 
puzzle box. Following this, children were asked the same questions to that asked in the video 252 
(“Which one do you want?” in the reward preference condition and the arbitrary preference 253 
condition and “Which one’s the biggest”? in the perceptual judgement condition). They were 254 
then allowed to retrieve the object from the Duobox. All children were thanked for their time, 255 
and received a sticker reward.  256 
  257 
Coding 258 
 For the conformity measure the children’s actions were coded as either matching the 259 
group (coded 1) or selecting the alternative (coded 0) depending on which compartment they 260 
interacted with first (this did not differ from the object selected). For imitation fidelity they 261 
were coded as either copying the removal of the defences exactly (coded 1), or using another 262 
sequence (coded 0). This was operationalised as successfully unlatching each defence in the 263 
exact order that had been demonstrated. This dichotomous coding was found to be the most 264 
explanatory way to code fidelity in this context. For overimitation, children were coded as 265 
having overimitated if they removed the causally irrelevant bolt (coded 1), or as not 266 
overimitating if they did not (coded 0). Finally, children were coded as successful if they 267 
retrieved the object from within the Duobox within 5 minutes (coded 1), or unsuccessful if 268 
they did not meet this criterion (coded 0). Testing was discretely recorded and coding was 269 
performed on the recorded data rather than live.  270 
Contrast coding was employed to reflect the following key theoretical comparisons. 271 
The first was between the arbitrary preference (coded 2) and conditions in which there was a 272 
motivation to depart from the observed consensus, the reward preference (coded -1) and 273 
perceptual judgment (coded -1) conditions. The second was between the two competing 274 
motivation conditions: reward preference, coded 1, perceptual judgment, coded -1, with 275 
12 
 
arbitrary preference coded 0.  For age, the five-year-old group was coded 1 and three-year-276 
olds coded -1. When conformity is entered as a predictor, conforming is coded 1, and not 277 
conforming coded -1.  278 
 279 
Results 280 
 281 
 To examine how age and norm domain affected young children’s conformity, 282 
imitation fidelity, overimitation, and success,  binary hierarchical logistic regressions were 283 
performed (bootstrapping 10,000 iterations). At step 1, age group along with norm domain 284 
were entered as predictors. For analyses of performance measures (imitation fidelity, 285 
overimitation, and success), conformity was also entered at step 1. The interactions between 286 
age group and norm domain were entered at step 2. Predictor analyses are reported in Table 287 
1, descriptive norm domain by age group cell descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. 288 
Our statistical model is performed in two steps to reflect our prioritisation of main effects, 289 
and then interactions. This statistical approach allowed us to examine differences based on 290 
experimental condition (which was of most theoretical importance, given our interest in the 291 
effect of normative domain), age, and then how these factors interacted. Where R2 is reported 292 
it is the Nagelkerke R2.  293 
 294 
[Table 1 about here] 295 
 296 
[Table 2 about here] 297 
 298 
Conformity  299 
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 At step 1, the model was significant, R2 = .14, Χ2 (3, N = 168) = 17.93, p < .001. 300 
Children demonstrated higher conformity in the arbitrary preference condition than the 301 
reward preference condition and perceptual judgment conditions, OR = 1.44, 95% CI [1.15, 302 
1.87]. However, there was no significant difference in conformity between the reward 303 
preference and perceptual judgement conditions, OR = 1.29, 95% CI [.87, 2.02]. Further 304 
three-year-olds (50% conform, SD = 50%) demonstrated significantly higher conformity than 305 
five-year-olds (31%, SD = 47%), OR = .65, 95% CI [.45, .90].  306 
At step 2, with the interaction terms in the model (for depiction see Figure 2), step 307 
change was non-significant, ΔR2 = .01, Χ2 (2, N = 168) = 1.84, p = .398, but the full model 308 
was significant, R2 = .15, Χ2 (2, N = 168) = 19.78, p = .001. The same pattern of results was 309 
observed for age group, OR = .63, 95% CI [.37, .88]. This was also the case for arbitrary 310 
preference versus reward preference and perceptual judgment conditions comparison, OR = 311 
1.45, 95% CI [1.16, 2.12], although there was no significant interaction with age, OR = 1.17, 312 
95% CI [.92, 1.66]. Again, as in step 1, there was no significant difference between reward 313 
preference and perceptual judgment conditions, OR = 1.33, 95% CI [.85, 2.50]; with there, 314 
further, being found to be no interaction with age, OR = 1.07, 95% CI [.67, 1.96].  315 
 316 
[Figure 2 about here] 317 
 318 
Performance measures 319 
 When examining imitation fidelity, the model was significant, R2 = .12, Χ2 (4, N = 320 
168) = 14.02, p = .007. Five-year-olds copied with higher fidelity than three-year-olds, OR = 321 
1.62, 95% CI [1.11, 2.61]. There was no difference in imitation fidelity between arbitrary 322 
preference compared with reward preference and perceptual judgment, OR = .79, 95% CI 323 
[.53, 1.07]. Further, there was no difference in imitation fidelity between those who 324 
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conformed (15% exact copy, SD = 36%) and those who produced the alternative 325 
judgement/preference (29% exact copy, SD = 46%), OR = .75, 95% CI [.44, 1.15]. With the 326 
age group by norm domain interaction terms in the model, the change statistic was non-327 
significant, ΔR2 = .02, Χ2 (2, N = 168) = 2.48, p = .248, but the full model was significant at 328 
step 2, R2 = .14, Χ2 (6, N = 168) = 16.51, p = .011. Age group remained significant in the 329 
same direction, OR = 1.54, 95% CI [.97, 40.37]. The arbitrary preference versus reward 330 
preference and perceptual judgment conditions comparison remained non-significant, OR = 331 
.82, 95% CI [.04, 3.73], as did the comparison of the reward preference and perceptual 332 
judgment conditions, OR = 1.15, 95% CI [.63, 2.25]; there was found to be no interaction 333 
with age for either of these comparisons, OR = .80, 95% CI [.15, 1.19], and OR = 1.12, 95% 334 
CI [.58, 2.08], respectively.   335 
The model predicting overimitation was significant at step 1, R2 = .16, Χ2 (4, N = 168) 336 
= 20.60, p = .001. Five-year-olds (62% overimitated, SD = 49%) overimitated significantly 337 
more than three-year-olds (34% overimitated, SD = 48%), OR = 1.81, 95% CI [1.34, 2.61]. 338 
Children in the arbitrary preference condition overimitated less when compared with the 339 
reward preference and perceptual judgment conditions, OR = .77, 95% CI [.59, .98]. 340 
However, there no difference in performance of overimitation behaviour between the reward 341 
preference and perceptual judgement conditions, OR = .78, 95% CI [.51, 1.19]. There was 342 
also no difference in overimitation between those children who conformed (40% 343 
overimitated, SD = 49%) and those who did not (53% overimitated, SD = 50%), OR = .95, 344 
95% CI [.66, 1.33]. At step 2, the change statistic was non-significant, ΔR2 = .01, Χ2 (2, N = 345 
168) = 1.56, p = .459; the full model was significant, R2 = .17, Χ2 (6, N = 168) = 22.16, p = 346 
.001. The pattern of results was not changed with the interaction terms in the model. Age was 347 
a significant predictor, OR = 1.82, 95% CI [1.32, 2.75]. There was a significant difference 348 
between arbitrary preference versus reward preference and perceptual judgment conditions, 349 
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OR = .77, 95% CI [.57, .98], although the interaction with age was non-significant, OR = 350 
1.03, 95% CI [.80, 1.37]. The difference between reward preference and perceptual judgment 351 
conditions was non-significant, OR = .79, 95% CI [.51, 1.21], likewise for its interaction with 352 
age, OR = 1.28, 95% CI [.85, 1.98].  353 
In terms of task success, the model was significant at step 1, R2 = .23, Χ2 (4, N = 168) 354 
= 23.01, p = .001. Five-year-olds (96% successful, SD = 19) were significantly more 355 
successful than three-year-olds (76%, SD = 43), OR = 2.74, 95% CI [1.55, 21741.97]. There 356 
was no difference in level of success between arbitrary preference compared with reward 357 
preference and perceptual judgment conditions, OR = .88, 95% CI [.58, 1.32]. There was also 358 
no difference between reward preference and perceptual judgement, OR = .79, 95% CI [.34, 359 
1.55]. In terms of conformity, those who conformed were less successful (77% successful, M 360 
= .76, SD = .43) than those who did not (93% successful, M = .93, SD = .26), OR = .58, 95% 361 
CI [.28, .98]. At step 2, the change statistic was not significant, ΔR2 = .01, Χ2 (2, N = 168) = 362 
.68, p = .712; the full model was significant, R2 = .24, Χ2 (6, N = 168) = 23.69, p = .001. The 363 
pattern of results was not changed with the interaction terms in the model. Five-year-olds 364 
were more successful than three-year-olds, OR = 2.59, 95% CI [1.49, 20050.31]. There was 365 
no difference in success in arbitrary preference as compared to reward preference and 366 
perceptual judgment condition, OR = .98, 95% CI [.04, 23.10], and the interaction of this 367 
comparison with age was also non-significant, OR = 1.18, 95% CI [.05, 1.32]. Likewise, for 368 
between reward preference and perceptual judgment, OR = .90, 95% CI [<.01, 112.17], and 369 
its interaction, OR = 1.21, 95% CI [.01, 165.17]. However, again, children who conformed 370 
less were more successful, OR = .57, 95% CI [.27, .98].  371 
 372 
Discussion 373 
 374 
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In summary, it was found that young children were more likely to conform to a 375 
consensus in the domain of an arbitrary preference condition compared to when there was a 376 
larger reward at stake or a correct perceptual judgment to make. However, 3-year-olds were 377 
more likely to conform than 5-year-olds. When considering the replication of the specific 378 
actions on the task, 5-year-olds were more faithful to the observed actions than 3-year-olds, 379 
and this included overimitating. Interestingly, children showed more overimitation in the 380 
reward preference and perceptual judgment conditions than in the arbitrary preference 381 
condition. Five-year-olds were also more successful compared to the 3-year-olds, irrespective 382 
of the condition; with those children who did not conform being more successful at the task.  383 
A pivotal challenge for understanding children’s learning and innovation is to 384 
establish when and why selectivity overrides fidelity (Carr, Kendal & Flynn, 2015, 2016; 385 
Over & Carpenter, 2012). The present study found that with regard to conformity, both 386 
domain and age influenced children’s willingness to copy the actions of a unanimous 387 
majority. That is, rather than conforming blindly children process the domain relevant 388 
information and modulate their conformity in response to it. Children conformed more to 389 
demonstrated consensus when the norm demonstrated was arbitrary, rather than in a domain 390 
marked by a conflict with personal information, as in the perceptual judgment task, or against 391 
personal interest, in the reward preference task. 392 
  At a gross level, this finding shows that when there is a competing behavioural 393 
tendency (such as a desire to be correct or for a large reward) conformity will diminish. 394 
Theorists give us several potential explanations for this effect. First, arbitrariness is a cause of 395 
ambiguity, which may result in a child not knowing what underpins the cause of a preference 396 
(in the case of the arbitrary preference condition, there is no cause) and therefore adopts a 397 
strategy of conforming (Walker & Andrade, 1996). Such a bias has been called a ‘copy-398 
when-uncertain’ strategy (Laland, 2012); the logic being that when one is uncertain taking on 399 
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the group behaviour is likely to lead to a more advantageous strategy than adopting a chance 400 
behaviour. Second, it may be that the child perceives the observed choice as purely 401 
conventional, or part of ritual, and thereby copies for injunctive/normative reasons; that is, 402 
the reproduction of the actions is the culturally right thing to do in this context (Legare et al., 403 
2015; Kapitany & Nielsen, 2015). Such normative behaviour allows affiliation and smooth 404 
integration with group members, as well as the acquisition of instrumental information, even 405 
when the causes of the behaviour are opaque (Over & Carpenter, 2012). Teasing apart these 406 
normative versus informational motivations for conformity is a difficult undertaking for 407 
researchers. For example, it is notable that within our experiment the perceptual judgment 408 
task contains a competing social goal as the child needed to announce their response to the 409 
experimenter, and such socially relevant factors as presenting a response in public versus 410 
private have been shown to modulate children’s conformity (Haun & Tomasello, 2011). But 411 
it appears that, despite such social pressure to copy the majority, under some contexts 412 
including when selecting which of two blocks is longer, the normative pressure to be correct 413 
is more powerful than the bias to copy a majority. In terms of the absolute levels of 414 
conformity observed, they were highest in the arbitrary preference condition (57%). 415 
Corriveau & Harris (2010) consistently observed conformity levels under 50%, whereas 416 
others have found higher levels (Bernard et al., 2015). The present experiment attests to the 417 
possibility that between task differences are likely to be important. Further, it is known that 418 
culture of the children in the experiment has a substantial impact (Corriveau & Harris, 2010; 419 
Corriveau et al., 2013). Similar previous research has shown that between condition effects 420 
are consistent over trials, though with conformity potentially diminishing (Bernard et al., 421 
2015; Corriveau & Harris, 2010). This suggests that the pattern of results in the current 422 
experiment, using a single trial, is valid, although future research is needed to properly 423 
address how conformity levels change over time. 424 
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 The present study corroborated previous research finding regarding children’s greater 425 
willingness to eschew conformity as they develop (Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Seston 426 
Schillaci & Kelemen, 2014; Walker & Andrade, 1996). Such results accord well with Flynn, 427 
Turner, and Giraldeau (2016) which suggests that 5-year-olds show more selectivity and 428 
understanding of when to deploy social (as well as asocial) information than 3-year-olds. 429 
Although not borne out by inferential statistics in the present study, five-year-olds may have 430 
been tending towards similar levels of conformity to three-year-olds in the arbitrary condition 431 
(4% difference), but showing an apparent proclivity not conform when there was a 432 
compelling competing reason (25% difference in both conditions). Future research may see if 433 
such a difference is reliable if an older cohort of children is considered.   434 
Likewise, our results reflect previous research showing that the quality and accuracy 435 
of imitation increases with age (McGuigan, Makinson & Whiten, 2011; McGuigan, Whiten, 436 
Flynn & Horner, 2007). In the present study this was evident in increased fidelity, 437 
overimitation, and success in 5-year-olds compared with 3-year-olds. Together these age 438 
results suggest that children become more competent over development at carrying out the 439 
learned behaviour or norms to which they have been exposed. Further, it was found that 440 
conforming children were less successful, they were less able to complete the task of 441 
retrieving the object from the apparatus, than non-conforming children. This makes sense in 442 
the light of Flynn and colleagues (2016), who found that children (5-year-olds specifically) 443 
who chose to learn individually, as opposed to socially, were more adept at completing a 444 
novel apparatus or tool-use task, than children who wished to learn socially, but received 445 
asocial learning instead. A potential explanation here being that children who depart from 446 
socially structured behaviour do so because they have succeeded using individual learning 447 
before, or can deduce an efficient solution.  448 
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By comparing normative domain judgement  and imitation behaviour findings, the 449 
present study highlights again children’s growing appreciation of how best to implement 450 
available information in their own behaviour, especially by five years old (in line with Flynn 451 
et al., 2016). Children are willing to eschew normative pressure to fulfil some motivated goal, 452 
as in attaining a reward, but may retain the methods used to achieve a goal. This suggests a 453 
hypothesis for continued research that children become more adept by the end of early 454 
development, at deploying available social information from the same sources, but about 455 
different aspects of a task (goal versus methods), to meet their own ends. Further, that 456 
departing from demonstrated goals and methods is bounded with children’s capacity to 457 
efficaciously acquire success with their own techniques (Flynn et al., 2016).  458 
It is notable that children overimiated more in the reward preference and perceptual 459 
judgment condition than in the arbitrary preference condition. It would seem hard to reconcile 460 
this difference with the hypothesis that overimitation in this study was the result of distorted 461 
causal understanding (e.g., Lyons, et al., 2007, 2011); that is, that children were more 462 
confused about if the redundant action was efficacious or not in the conditions with a 463 
competing motivation than when the choice was arbitrary (especially given the ability of 464 
children to dissociate goals and actions described above). Rather, our conjecture would be 465 
that the social expectations of the context may be playing a role, and that the overimiated 466 
action can be seen as part of an injunctive norm: a thing you are supposed to do (Kenward, 467 
Karlsson, & Persson, 2011; Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013; Nielsen & Blank 2010; Over & 468 
Carpenter, 2012). Specifically, that in a context in which there was no right answer, there was 469 
no ‘correct’ actions to perform; whereas, when there is a correct or better option, a proportion 470 
of children may have inferred there was a correct way to perform the task, including the 471 
redundant action (which in reality posed little cost in terms of time).  472 
20 
 
Our results provide important insights into the development of conformity showing 473 
when, and under which conditions, young children copy the majority versus when they 474 
undertake an alternative. For society to function effectively, in terms of both technological 475 
and social systems, we must conform to a consensus. However, blind conformity has negative 476 
consequences including the transmission of misinformation and the stagnation of innovation, 477 
resulting in a lack of progress in cultural evolution (Dean, et al., 2014). Methodologically, 478 
our results speak to the necessity to consider how different cognitive and social factors affect 479 
the generalisability of conformity research with young children. Further, that there are 480 
important nuances around children’s selectivity versus fidelity in copying goals and actions 481 
(Over & Carpenter, 2012). These results demonstrate how, within a Western culture, children 482 
are willing to deviate from a consensus when it is in their interest, in terms of acquiring a 483 
larger reward, or when the consensus is perceptually inaccurate and would result in an 484 
incorrect response being reported. However, when the cause for a consensus is ambiguous 485 
children conform. Such a finding show young children can make informed decisions so as not 486 
to simply ‘follow the crowd’. In teaching children, these results suggest that providing clear 487 
information about the rationale for a majority’s behaviour will aid children to make incisive 488 
decisions across domains about when, and when not, to conform.     489 
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Figures 601 
 602 
 603 
Figure 1. Duobox: left-side shows box in assembled state, right-side shows box with defences removed, (a) ‘bolt’, (b) ‘lock’, (c) ‘hook’, (d) 604 
‘latch’.    605 
  606 
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 607 
 608 
Figure 2. The proportion of children matching the descriptive norm (conforming) by domain and age group.   609 
 610 
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Tables 613 
 614 
Table 1. Hierarchical binary multiple regression analyses of age and norm domain on outcome variables (conformity, imitation fidelity, 615 
overimitation and success). Rows contain predictors at each step and columns dependent variables and associated statistics.   616 
 Conformity  Imitation fidelity  Overimitation  Success 
 β S.E. p  β S.E. p  β S.E. p  β S.E. p 
Step 1                
   Intercept  -.43 .17 .010*  -1.39 .28 .001*  -.11 .18 .529  2.28 2.11 .001* 
   Age  -.43 .18 .011*  .49 .22 .014*  -.60 .17 .001*  1.01 2.00 .002* 
   Arb. judg. vs. r. pref. & per. j.   .36 .12 .002*  -.24 .21 .128  -.26 .13 .032*  -.13 .32 .469 
   Per. judg. vs. r. pref.   .26 .22 .212  .17 .23 .434  -.25 .21 .210  -.24 .81 .467 
   Conformity      -.28 .24 .205  -.05 .18 .788  -.54 .46 .034* 
Step 2                
   Intercept -.46 .50 .006*  -1.38 .88 .001*  -.12 .24 .503  2.25 .33 .001* 
   Age  -.46 .50 .006*  .43 .88 .020*  .60 .23 .001*  .95 .33 .004* 
   Arb. judg. vs. r. pref. & per. j .37 .27 .001*  -.20 .69 .172  -.26 .20 .030*  -.02 .23 .919 
   Per. judg. vs. r. pref.   .28 .74 .190  .14 .96 .536  -.24 .22 .233  -.11 .40 .783 
   Age by Arb. j. vs. r. pref. & per. j. .16 .27 .179  -.23 .68 .108  .03 .20 .840  .16 .23 .482 
   Age by Per. j. vs. r. pref.    .06 .73 .758  .11 .95 .612  .25 .21 .210  .19 .40 .638 
   Conformity     -.27 .25 .251  -.05 .19 .789  -.56 .26 .029* 
N = 168 *p < .05.  617 
 618 
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 622 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics by age group and norm domain condition.  623 
 Perceptual 
judgement  
Reward 
preference  
Percept. judg. & 
r. pref.  
Arbitrary 
preference 
 % (SD%)  % (SD%)  % (SD%)  % (SD%) 
Conformity  25 (44)  38 (49)  32 (47)  57 (50) 
   Three-years-old 39 (50)  50 (51)  44 (50)  61 (50) 
   Five-years-old 14 (36)  25 (44)  20 (40)  54 (51) 
Imitation fidelity 25 (44)  30 (46)  28 (45)  14 (35) 
   Three-years-old 14 (35)  14 (36)  14 (36)  14 (36) 
   Five-years-old 36 (49)  46 (51)  41 (50)  14 (36) 
Overimitation 60 (49)  48 (50)  54 (50)  36 (48) 
   Three-years-old 52 (51)  29 (46)  40 (49)  21 (42) 
   Five-years-old 68 (48)  68 (48)  68 (47)  50 (51) 
Task success 93 (26)  86 (35)  89 (31)  82 (39) 
   Three-years-old 89 (32)  75 (44)  82 (39)  68 (48) 
   Five-years-old 96 (19)  96 (19)  96 (19)  96 (19) 
 624 
 625 
